

A NOVEL SECURED DATA COMMUNICATION AND PREVENTION OF FORGERY ATTACKS USING SHARED SECRET KEY ALGORITHM

DASARI MANENDRA SAI,

Assoc. Professor,
Department of CSE,
Sai Ganapathi Engineering College,
Visakhapatnam

DEKKA SATISH

Asst. Professor
Department of CSE,
Sai Ganapathi Engineering College
Visakhapatnam

ABSTRACT:

Today almost all organizations in the world are network-centric paradigm and to safeguard the data in a world where technology is advancing, systems are changing rapidly and information flows freely requires efficient secure channel at the endpoint. Security is the heart of IT revolution and more specifically user authentication and key establishment are the rudimentary services in secure communications. Though many systems, schemes bank on public key digital certificate user authentication and key establishment, failed in getting authenticated due to some forgery attacks. Public key Digital certificate though gained popularity in the public key infrastructure (PKI) in providing authentication to user public key, itself cannot be used to safeguard an authenticate user. In this paper, we propose a novel approach using GDC for user authentication and key establishment. A GDC is a kind of Digital Certificate which contains user's public information and Digital signature which is issued and signed by the trusted Certificate Authority. The advantage of GDC is that, unlike the public key Digital Certificate, it does not contain user's public key. So, the digital signature can never be revealed to the verifier and this is where a digital signature of GDC becomes a security factor that can be used for user authentication. Using this phenomenon, we have implemented a Discrete Logarithm Protocol which satisfies in achieving user authentication and secret key establishment. In addition to this, by using the shared-secret key, we have also exchanged the data between the entities through AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) or TDEA (Triple Data Encryption Algorithm) Cryptographic algorithm.

Keywords: Generalized digital certificate, user authentication, key establishment, shared-secret key, forgery attacks, data exchange (encryption and decryption).

I. INTRODUCTION

The main objective of cryptography is to provide security to data that has to be transferred through a secure Public Network. The major principles of security

like authentication, confidentiality, Data Integrity, Non-repudiation are being agreed on the current public key Infrastructure model (PKI model). A public key infrastructure (PKI) is a system of digital certificates, certification authorities (CAs), and registration authorities that verify and authenticate the validity of each entity that is involved in an electronic transaction through the use of public key cryptography. A Digital Certificate consists of a statement and the digital signature of the statement, that is signed by trusted certificate Authority who issues certificates to each registered user. The statement in a Digital Certificate consists of Public key which proves the uniqueness of the user with respect to the trusted CA. The current system of PKI consists of X.509 Digital Certificate [3], that has been widely using in authentication of a user. The authentication of a user in X.509 Digital Certificate can be accepted if he is able to prove that he has knowledge of private key corresponding to the public key mentioned in the certificate.

In X.509 Digital Certificate, the sender's digital signature is encrypted with the receiver's public key. So, when the receiver gets the encrypted digital signature of the sender with his public key, he uses his private key to decrypt it so as to get the Digital signature of the sender. Then the receiver decrypts the digital signature of the sender by applying sender's public key which he got through the Digital Certificate of the sender to get the original text he received. Even though this mechanism works well to satisfy the

basic security principles, there is a flaw identified in this that is, there may be a chance of forgery attack on the sender's Digital Signature. The Digital signature of the sender can be captured in the communication as when the receiver decrypts the whole text with his own private key. If a malicious receiver got the digital signature and can encrypt it with the third party's public key to send it in the name of legitimate sender. Then the third party will think that this message came from the legitimate sender only. This forgery attack is not addressed in the current public key Digital Certificate. To prevent this attack, we propose a novel design by using generalized digital Certificate (GDC) for user authentication and key establishment [1]. This Generalized Digital Certificate does not contain any user's public key, instead it maintains user's public information such as SSN number, Digital driving license etc. And the sender's digital signature is also not sent to the verifier (receiver) directly in plain text. To prove his genuinity the sender has to face a challenge provided by the verifier. If the sender is able to prove his genuinity by responding to the verifier's challenge, then the user is authenticated. For this authentication mechanism we have implemented a new Discrete Logarithm based protocol. However, in this protocol there is no public key and no digital signature consent, so the malicious receiver cannot forget the digital signature of the sender.

In addition to this, the DL based protocol also involves in establishing a shared session secret key, which can be used for user encryption and Decryption of the messages for secure communications [2]. Since, this shared key is just one time session key, even though the intruder gets the shared key, he cannot use it for other sessions. However getting the shared key is difficult task to an intruder since it can only be generated by applying random integers from the two entities(i.e. the user

and the verifier uses different key pairs for generating the shared session key). Since there is no specific public-private key pair for GDC, the key management is very easy than public key digital certificate.

The following are the related works done to implement DL based protocol using GDC. Apart from GDC providing user authentication and key establishment, there are some public key authentication based protocols available which rely on Public Key Digital certificates.

Message Digest (MD5):

MD5 algorithm takes input message of arbitrary length and generates 128-bit long output hash [5]. These generation functions must fulfill these requirements:

- 1) No one should be able to produce two different inputs for which the transformation function returns the same output
- 2) No one should be able to produce input for given pre specified output.

Digital Certificate:

In cryptography, a digital certificate or identity certificate is an electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a public key with an identity — information such as the name of a person or an organization, their address, and so forth. The certificate can be used to verify that a public key belongs to an individual.

DL (Discrete Algorithm)

The Discrete logarithms[8] are the group-theoretic analogue of ordinary logarithms, which solve the same equation for some real numbers b and g , where b is the base of the logarithm and g is the value whose logarithm is being taken. In view of mathematics, a discrete logarithm defines an integer k solving an equation $b^k = g$, where b and g are elements of a group. Computing discrete logarithms is believed to be difficult. No efficient general method

for computing discrete logarithms on conventional computers is known, and several important algorithms in public-key cryptography base their security on the assumption that the discrete logarithm problem has no efficient solution.

II. Methodology

1) Implementation of DL-based Protocol:

a) Prologue

There is a pitfall Public-Key Digital Certificate that is it alone cannot safeguard and provide authentication to user's public key due to some forgery attacks and manipulation of digital signatures.

To overcome this drawback, in our scheme we have proposed a novel approach using GDC for user authentication and key establishment. In GDC, digital signature becomes the major security factor that can be used for user authentication as it can never be revealed to the verifier.

In this paper, the implementation of DL-based based protocol is a blend of DL-based digital signature for user authentication and non-repudiation and the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol for obtaining the shared session key.

b) Overview of Elgamal Digital Signature, Hashing functions and Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol

The ElGamal signature scheme is a digital signature scheme [1],[6],[7] which is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. The ElGamal signature scheme allows a third-party to confirm the authenticity of a message sent over an insecure channel. ElGamal signature is usually generated by the CA and it consists of (r_A, s_A) where 'r' represents the random integer and 's' represents the signature component (secret key) assigned by the CA to the user. This signature in our protocol can be verified by

the verifier to authenticate the user's message digest 'm' by checking whether the following equation

$$g^m = y^r r^s \text{ mod } p,$$

Holds true.

The role of hashing function in our protocol is mainly used for generating the shared-secret key which is just a one-time session key and is generated by applying random integers from the two entities (i.e. the user and the verifier's key pairs). A cryptographic hash function is a hash function that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string; the cryptographic hash value such that any change to the data will change the hash value. The hash value is sometimes called the **message digest**.




Fig 1. A cryptographic Hash Function.

The role of Diffie-Hellman Assumption in our protocol is to generate a one-time session shared-secret key which is used for exchanging the data between the entities for secure communications. By using the user's (A) and the verifier's (B) private keys x_A and x_B , and their corresponding public keys, y_A and y_B . Only user and verifier can calculate a shared-secret key $K_{A,B} = y_B^{x_A} = y_A^{x_B} = K_{B,A} \text{ mod } p$.

Diffie-Hellman protocol is based on the assumption that it is mathematically impossible to determine $K_{A,B}$ without knowing the private key x_A or x_B .

c) Mechanism of DL-based Protocol

In order to achieve user authentication and key establishment along with some additional security requirements like Unforgeability, One-wayness, Non-repudiation then it is possible through DL-based protocol. Following are the entities involved in the implementation of DL-based protocol:

1) **User:** The user, who is the owner of GDC, is a person who receives the GDC from a trusted CA over a secure channel. The owner proves to the verifier's challenge question that he has the knowledge of the signature.

2) **Verifier:** The verifier is the person who challenges the owner of the GDC with a "question" and validates the answer using the user's public information, message digest (m) sent and CA's public key.

The steps involved in the mechanism of DL-based protocol are as follows:

- Initially user sends the message digest m_A along with the ElGamal Signature (r_A, s_A) to the verifier.
- Verifier verifies for user authentication by computing the values send by the user through this equation:
$$g^m = y^r r^s \mod p.$$
- If the equation holds true then the user is authenticated and authentication is success else authentication fails.
- On successful authentication the verifier randomly selects v_B and computes $c_B = r_A^{v_B} \mod p$ as a challenge question and sends it to the user.
- Now user using the Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol randomly selects v_A and computes $c_A = r_A^{v_A} \mod p$ along with $K_{A,B}$ and ACK and sends it to the verifier.
- After receiving the ACK and c_A from the user, the verifier uses his secret key v_B to the Diffie-Hellman shared-secret key and checks whether the ACK is true. If the verification is successful, then the user is authenticated by the verifier and a one-time secret-session key is generated between both the

entities which provide an efficient path for security.

The below mentioned figure is used for better and simple understanding of the above mentioned steps. This figure step by step explains the working of DL-based protocol along with participation of entities, user authentication and key establishment.




Fig 2 Implementation of DL- based protocol for user authentication and key establishment

d) Justification of Security Analysis

It is clear from the previous section that the proposed protocol satisfies the security- requirements: Unforgeability, One-wayness, Non-transferability [1] and Non-repudiation. In this section, we are going to analyze how these security properties are satisfying to the DL-based protocol in achieving user authentication and key establishment.

1. **Unforgeability:** It is infeasible for the intruder to perform a forgery attack without knowing the secret signature component s_A to get a pair (r_A, s_A) to satisfy it in the equation $g^m = y^r r^s \mod p$ and also compute $K_{A,B}$ to forge a valid ACK. Thus, the DL-based protocol satisfies its security against forgery attacks.

2. **One-wayness:** It is infeasible to compute secret key s_A from the signature component S_A because it is a DL-based

protocol problem and even though the verifier knows the Diffie-Hellman key $K_{A,B}$ which is used by the user in computing the $K_{A,B}$, but the verifier cannot obtain the secret key s_A as it is never revealed during by the user during their communication. Thus, the DL-based protocol satisfies its one-wayness property.

3. **Non transferability:** Since we are using the concept of Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol in DL-based protocol, a valid response ACK can only be generated by a user knows who his secret digital signature component s_A issued by the CA, or by a verifier who knows his random challenge question c_B selected randomly to validate the user, and this response ACK is valid for only one-time session. Thus, there is no chance of unauthorized user to pretend as authorized to the opponent entity. Thus, the DL-based protocol also satisfies its non-transferability property. Since, the digital signature of the user is never revealed during the communication and there is no chance of it getting manipulated as there is no privacy intrusion problem the proposed protocol also satisfies the non-repudiation property.

TDES Algorithm:

TDES (Triple Data Encryption Algorithm) is a symmetric block cipher developed by IBM. The algorithm uses a 56-bit key to encipher/decipher a 64-bit block of data. The key is always presented as a 64-bit block, every 8th bit of which is ignored. However, it is usual to set each 8th bit so that each group of 8 bits has an odd number of bits set to 1.

The algorithm is best suited to implementation in hardware, probably to discourage implementations in software, which tend to be slow by comparison. However, modern computers are so fast that satisfactory software implementations are readily available.

DES is the most widely used symmetric algorithm in the world, despite claims that the key length is too short.

Ever since DES was first announced, controversy has raged about whether 56 bits is long enough to guarantee security.

The key length argument goes like this. Assuming that the only feasible attack on DES is to try each key in turn until the right one is found, then 1,000,000 machines each capable of testing 1,000,000 keys per second would find (on average) one key every 12 hours. Most reasonable people might find this rather comforting and a good measure of the strength of the algorithm.

Those who consider the exhaustive key-search attack to be a real possibility (and to be fair the technology to do such a search is becoming a reality) can overcome the problem by using double or triple length keys. In fact, double length keys have been recommended for the financial industry for many years.

Use of multiple length keys leads us to the Triple-DES algorithm, in which DES is applied three times. If we consider a triple length key to consist of three 56-bit keys K_1 , K_2 , K_3 then encryption is as follows:

- Encrypt with K_1
- Decrypt with K_2
- Encrypt with K_3

Decryption is the reverse process:

- Decrypt with K_3
- Encrypt with K_2
- Decrypt with K_1

Setting K_3 equal to K_1 in these processes gives us a double length key K_1 , K_2 . Setting K_1 , K_2 and K_3 all equal to K has the same effect as using a single-length (56-bit key). Thus it is possible for a system using triple-DES to be compatible with a system using single-DES.


III. Implementation and Data Analysis

The practical implementation of the topics, mentioned under methodology is explained in this section with detailed description. As per data analysis for DL-based protocol, it contains the following modules:

- 1) User Module
- 2) Verifier Module
- 3) Authentication Module
- 4) Key Generation
- 5) Data Exchange Module using shared-secret

User module: Once the Client and Server are connected the User window is invoked by allowing the user to participate in the communication by entering the values.

User window




The User-side Window interface includes the following fields and buttons:

- Private key: Public key:
- Random integers:
- Enter vA: Enter rA:
- Enter Message:
- Compute sA button
- sA Value: Compute SA button
- SA Value:
- Send button
- CB Value:
- calculate CA & ACK button
- CA: ACK:
- Send button
- Key Generation button
- Shared key:
- DataExchange button

Fig 4 User-side Window

Verifier module: Similarly, in this module also once the Client and Server are connected the verifier window is invoked by allowing the verifier to participate in the communication.

Verifier window



The Verifier-side Window interface includes the following fields and buttons:

- Private key: Public key:
- Enter vB Value:
- Values from UserA:
- YA: rA: SA:
- Message:
- Authentication button
- CB Value:
- Find CB Value button
- Send button
- CA: ACK:
- Ack Verification button
- Key Generation: button
- Shared Key:
- Data Exchange button

Fig 5 Verifier-side Window

Authentication module: Once the user window is invoked the user begins the


communication with the the ElGamal Signature (r_A , s_A) to the verifier.

The verifier verifies for user authentication by computing the values send by the user through this equation: verifier by sending the message digest m_A along with

$$g^m = y^r r^s \text{ mod } p.$$

If the equation holds true then the user is authenticated and authentication is success else authentication fails.

User window




The User window interface with values entered:

- Private key: 45 Public key: 118
- Random integers:
- Enter vA: 66 Enter rA: 128
- Enter Message: 24-09-93
- Compute sA button
- sA Value: 27 Compute SA button
- SA Value: 619
- Send button

Fig 6 User computing S_A and Message digest m for user authentication

Verifier window



The Verifier window interface with values entered:

- Private key: 54 Public key: 956
- Enter vB Value: 98
- Values from UserA:
- YA: 118 rA: 128 SA: 619
- Message: 24-09-93
- Authentication button

Fig 6.1 Verifier validating the respective user

Mathematical analysis of the equation, $g^m = y^r r^s \text{ mod } p$ and the user authentication based on the values sent by the user is explained as follows:

Initially, the user selects a large prime 'p' and a generator 'g' in the order of p-1 which are shared and agreed commonly by all the entities. Now the user selects a random private key $p_1 \in [1, p-1]$ and

basing on it computes the corresponding public key $y_A = g^k \text{ mod } p$. Then the user randomly selects a secret value (parameter) $k \in [1, p-1]$ with $\text{gcd}(k, p-1) = 1$ and computes random integer $r_A = g^k \text{ mod } p$.

From the above figure at user side, the user enters the random private key 'p1' as 45 and basing on it the public key y_A , random integer r_A are obtained respectively as 118, 128. Now the user calculates ' s_A ' (secret key) by using this formula $m = ks + rx \text{ mod } p-1$ and from the figure we get the value as 27. After getting the s_A value, the user calculates the ' S_A ' such that $S_A = r_A^{s_A}$ and we get the value as 619. Now the user substitutes these values in this equation:

$$g^m = y^r r^s \text{ mod } p.$$

Here 'g' is assumed to be 122 and 'p' is assumed to be 123 and 'm' is assumed to be 3. Thus we get the g^m value as 1815848 and similarly on substituting the values of ' y_A ', ' r_A ', 'p' on the right-hand-side we get $1.77529 \times 100 \approx 181529$. Hence both the sides of the equation are obtained as approximately equal. Now the user sends the ElGamal signature (r_A, s_A), message digest 'm' and public key y_A to the verifier. On receiving these values from the user, the verifier also substitutes these values in this equation:

$$g^m = y^r r^s \text{ mod } p.$$

The verifier also gets both the sides of the equation equal as 'g' and 'p' values are commonly shared and agreed by both the entities. Thus, at both the ends the above equation is proved and satisfied as per the mathematical analysis and basing on this identity the user is authenticated by the verifier.

Key Generation module: Once the user is authenticated the verifier randomly selects v_B and computes $c_B = r_A^{v_B} \text{ mod } p$ as a challenge question and sends it to the user for the purpose of non-repudiation.

Verifier window




Fig 7 Verifier Calculating c_B value

Now after getting the c_B value from the verifier, the user using the Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol randomly selects v_A and computes $c_A = r_A^{v_A} \text{ mod } p$ and response ACK and sends it back to the verifier.

User window




Fig 7.1 User calculating c_A and ACK

After receiving the ACK and c_A from the user, the verifier uses his secret key v_B to the Diffie-Hellman shared-secret key and checks whether the ACK is true. If the ACK is true, the authentication is successful else fail.

Verifier window



Fig 7.2 Verifier checking for ACK verification

The mathematical analysis of the Key Generation module is explained as follows:

Once the user is authenticated the verifier computes the c_B value by substituting the values of r_A, v_B in this equation: $c_B = r_A^{v_B} \text{ mod } p$ and gets the approximate value as $493.778 \approx 494$ and sends it to the user.

The user on receiving the c_B value, uses his secret key s_A to compute the Diffie-Hellman secret-key $K_{A,B} = c_B^{s_A} \text{ mod } p$. Now the user computes the c_A value by substituting the values of r_A, v_A in this equation: $c_A = r_A^{v_A} \text{ mod } p$ and gets the approximate value as 589. Along with c_A the user also calculates the response

$ACK = h(K_{A,B}, c_B || c_A)$, where 'h' represents a one-way hash function. From the above figure the 'h' value i.e the ACK value is obtained as 549265. Now the user sends the c_A and the response ACK values to the verifier.

The verifier on receiving the ACK and c_A from the user, the verifier uses his secret key v_B to the Diffie-Hellman shared-secret key and checks whether the ACK is true i.e the verifier solves the equation $K_{B,A} = S_A^{v_B} \mod p$ and checks whether $h(K_{A,B}, c_B || c_A) = ACK$ is true. Thus, on substituting the values of S_A, v_B in the above in this equation: $K_{B,A} = S_A^{v_B} \mod p$, the verifier also gets the same value 549265, which is sent by the user. Thus, using the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the response ACK is same on both the sides and holds true for the hash function $h(K_{A,B}, c_B || c_A) = ACK$ which clearly specifies the successful ACK verification.

If the verification is successful, then the user is authenticated by the verifier and a one-time secret-session key is generated between both the entities which provides an efficient path for security. The user and the verifier clicks on the **Key Generation** button to generate shared-secret key for the purpose of key agreement and secure communication.

User window , Verifier window




Fig 7.3 Shared-secret Key generated at both sides (user,verifier)

Data Exchange module using shared-secret key: Now after getting this One-time shared session key we have also provided an additional facility for exchanging the data between both the entities (user,verifier) using a secured AES cryptographic algorithm.

The user and the verifier clicks on the **Data Exchange** button in their respective windows for exchanging the data in a

secured fashion. After clicking the Data-Exchange button 2 windows are invoked simultaneously at both the ends allowing both the entities to transfer their data basing on the shared-secret key.

User window , Verifier window




Fig 8 Data Exchange button for exchanging of data

The data exchange between the entities happens by undergoing the internal operation of AES and MD-5 algorithm such that, at the user side the user enters the data to be sent into the text field and clicks on the **Encrypt and send** button to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the message.

The verifier on receiving the data clicks on the **Decrypt and receive** button to decode the cipher text into the original text, once the original message is received by the verifier, to send the data to the user the verifier also follows the same procedure by entering the text into the text field and clicking the encrypt & send button. In this way, the user also receives the encrypted message from the verifier. This entire mechanism is described below in this diagram:

User window




Fig 8.1 Data transmitting and receiving at User-side

Verifier window



Fig 8.2 Data transmitting and receiving at Verifier-side

IV. Conclusion and Future Enhancement

In this paper, we have proposed GDC as a novel approach by highlighting its salient features for user authentication and key establishment when compared to the existing X.509 Public Key Digital Certificate. We have also implemented the DL-based protocol based on the concept of GDC, which works successfully and efficiently by generating optimized values at each and every module. We have also embedded an additional facility in this paper by providing the data exchange module based on one-time session key generated by using the secured AES cryptographic algorithm.

For future enhancement, the proposed system can be extended by implementing another protocol which is more secured, efficient, and feasible when compared to the DL-based protocol. The another alternative is the IF- (Integer Factor) based protocol whose security depends on the combination of RSA Signature and One-way- hash function. The protocol provides deniable authentication and protects privacy of the digital certificate. In this paper, we have used AES algorithm for secure exchange of data between the entities for further extension our approach can be applied to more advanced and secured cryptographic techniques for secure exchange of data.

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